The Investment Chapter
The
framework provided in Chapter 10 of the Agreement comprises of, in
board terms, the aspects relating to: (1) covered investments; (2)
market Access; (3) investment protection; and(4) expropriation. Our
general observation on each of these aspects is as follows:
(1) Covered investments
In
order to be considered as a “covered investment” under the Agreement,
the investment must be (a) made by an investor of a Contracting Party in
the territory of the host Contracting Party; (b) be admitted by the
host Contracting Party (where applicable); and
(c) in existence as at the date of the Agreement or thereafter (Article 10.1(a)).
The
RCEP adopted an asset based criteria in defining an investment under
the Agreement and a board range of items are considered as ‘investment”
for such purpose. These items include: (i) shares, stocks and other
forms of equity participation; (ii) bonds, debentures, loans, and other
debt instruments; (iii) rights under contracts; (iv) intellectual
property rights and goodwill; (v) claims to money or to any contractual
performance related to a business and having financial value; (vi)
concessions, licenses, authorizations, and permits conferred by the host
Contracting Party, including those for the exploration and exploitation
of natural resources; and (vii) movable and immovable property and
other property rights. The aforesaid items must have the characteristics
of an investment such as the commitment of capital or other resources,
the expectation of gains or profits or the assumption.
(2) Market Access
In
relation to market access, the RCEP adopts a “negative list” approach
for investment entry and also a framework for future liberalization
efforts. The framework also provides for investment facilitation by
ensuring transparency and streamlining administrative procedures for
investors. In keeping with best practice, the framework accords to
investors of another Contracting Party and to covered investments
national treatment and most favoured nation treatment, albeit qualifying
them to be accorded only in “like circumstances”, which according to
the footnote to these two provisions means “whether the treatment is
accorded in “like circumstances” in this Article depends on the totality
of the circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment
distinguishes between investors or investments on the basis of
legitimate public welfare objectives”.
(3) Investment Protection
Investment
protection measures under the framework, in addition to above-mentioned
national treatment and most favoured nation treatment mentioned above,
include:
Prohibition
of Performance Requirements: measures imposing or enforcing as a
condition for the establishment and operation of an investment other
than those set out in List A or List B of a Contracting Party in its
Schedule in Annex III (Schedule of Reservations and Non-Conforming
Measures for Services and Investment) of the Agreement are prohibited.
Such conditions include (a) quantitative requirement for export; (b)
achievement of a given level of domestic content; (c) purchase, use of
or preference accord to goods produced in the territory of the host
Contracting Party; (d) correlation between the import value or export
volume and the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with
investment of that investor; (e) restriction on sales in the territory
by relating such sales to the export volume or value or foreign exchange
gains; (f) compulsorily transfer a particular technology, production
process or proprietary knowhow to a person in the territory of the host
Contracting Party; (g) exclusive supply of goods to a specific regional
market or to the world; (h) adoption of a given rate or amount of
royalty under an existing or future licensing contract in a manner that
constitutes direct interference with that licensing contract by an
exercise of non-judicial government authority of the imposing or
enforcing Contracting Party;
Treatment
of Investments: Article 10.5 the Agreement mandates that the host
Contracting Party shall accord fair and equitable treatment, and full
protection and security to covered investments. As a matter of
international trade law practice, unqualified fair and equitable
treatment clause have been generously interpreted by arbitral tribunals
to the detriment of the host country. The RCEP investment framework
qualifies the concept of fair and equitable treatment to mean each
Contracting Party is required “not to deny justice in any legal or
administrative proceedings”, and that the concept of full protection and
security is likewise qualified to mean each Contracting Party is
required “to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary to ensure
the physical protection and security of the covered investment”.
Further, the above concepts do not require treatment to be accorded to
covered investments “in addition to or beyond that which is required
under the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens, and do not create additional substantive rights.”13. This
Article relating to treatment of investment shall be interpreted in
accordance with Annex 10A (Customary International Law).
The
Agreement set out certain conditions in which benefit under the
Investment Chapter may be denied.15 Under the denial of benefits clause
in the Agreement (which is commonly found in contemporary FTAs), a Party
may deny the benefit of the Investment Chapter to an investor that is a
juridical person of another Party and to investments of that investors
in two instances (i) where such juridical person is owned or controlled
by a person of a non-Party or of the denying Party; (ii) if it has no
substantial business
activities in the territory of any Party other than the denying Party. Thailand and the
Philippines have country specific provisions in the denial of benefit
clause.
(4) Expropriation
Except
for a public purpose and acting in a non-discriminatory manner in
accordance with due process of law, and with compensation paid in a
manner specified in the Agreement, Article 10.13 prohibits Contracting
Parties expropriating or nationalizing a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation
or nationalization.
On
the issue of indirect expropriation through measures, it is a bit
surprising to find that the text have not followed the growing best
practice in international investment agreements of adopting a criterion
as to what would constitute indirect expropriation for the purpose of
the Agreement. However, the text do intentionally craved out compulsory
licenses in relation to intellectual property rights from the
application of Article 13.17 One other exception relates to measures
concerning expropriation of land, which shall be defined in the existing
laws and regulations of the expropriating Contracting Party and that
compensation shall be paid in accordance with such laws and regulations.
Effectively
realizable and freely transferable compensation equivalent to the fair
market value of the expropriated investment either at the time when the
expropriation was publicly announced, or when the expropriation
occurred, whichever is the earlier, shall be paid without delay. In the
event of delay in payment, the compensation shall include an appropriate
interest in accordance with the laws, regulations and policy of the
expropriating Contracting Party.
Article
10.13 shall be read in conjunction with Annex 10B of the Agreement
which provides that “an action or a series of related action by a Party
cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible
or intangible property or property interest in a covered investment.”
18 The Annex further clarifies the term direct expropriation by
providing that direct expropriation may happen in two situations, where
(1) expropriation
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure; and (2) an action
or a series of related actions has an effect equivalent to direct
expropriation through actions specified in the aforesaid situation (1).
The
Annex further provides that whether an action or a series of actions
constitutes an expropriation referred to in the above-mentioned
situation (2) shall be determined on a case by case, fact-based inquiry
basis taking into consideration, inter alia, (a) the economic impact of
the government action, however, adverse economic effect on a
standing alone basis is not sufficient to establish that an expropriation has occurred; and
(b) whether the government is in breach of its prior binding
written commitment to the investor.
Although
the Agreement does not provide a mechanism for investor-state dispute
settlement, yet it effectively confers an international contractual
obligation on the government of Contracting Parties to act in accordance
with such obligation. As such, it could serve as a basis for aggrieved
investors to urge the expropriating Contracting Party to consider the
issue of compensation in accordance with this particular provision of
the Agreement in order to comply with its international obligation.
Obviously, aggrieved investors also have an option to convince their
home State to bring a claim against the host State in a manner set out
in the Dispute Settlement Chapter of the Agreement.
One
encouraging sign is that the Contracting Parties have not ruled out the
possibility of including investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in
the future. Under Article 10.18, the Contracting Parties commit
themselves to a work program to enter into negotiation on the issue of
inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement, as well as the
application of the expropriation provision to taxation measures that
constitute expropriation, within two years after the Agreement came
into force.
This
article which only focuses on the Investment Chapter of the Agreement
is the first of a series of articles introducing the RCEP framework to
be published by us. Please free feel to contact us should you require
additional information or advice on all other aspects of the RCEP
Agreement not covered in this article.